Svyaz-Bank and Globex Bank were in a Severely Poor Condition

19 june 2009 года

№ 106, June 19, 2009


In Anatoly’s Tikhonov”s opinion Svyaz-Bank and Globex were in a severely poor condition. “We need not only support problem banks but also give a fresh impetus to boost the economy.” With the advent of the crisis, Vnesheconombank’s financial resources were needed to support the Russian banking system, specifically, to stabilize the troubled Svyaz-Bank’s financial position. First Deputy Chairman of State Corporation ‘Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank)’, Chairman of Svyaz-Bank’s Board of Directors Anatoly TIKHONOV told us about Vnesheconombank’s rescue efforts and the future of Svyaz-Bank in his interview with Vremya Novostei.

- Why did Vnesheconombank get involved in rescuing Svyaz-Bank?

- Svyaz-Bank was the first swallow that got into the whirlwind of the crisis. A decision to rescue it was taken in accordance with orders given by the President, the Prime Minister and VEB’s Supervisory Board. We could not let this bank collapse because it handled more than 15 million accounts of pensioners. In the course of several months we managed to correct the imbalance between assets and liabilities, clean up the loan portfolio and make a comprehensive business analysis of the bank. Our line departments examined the situation and proposed a rescue package. In April, VEB made an additional issue of the bank’s shares worth 70 billion rubles. As a result, the bank’s charter capital was increased 15-fold to 75.1 billion rubles. And today the bank is operating normally.

-Were Svyaz-Bank’s problems that necessitated the state’s emergency intervention brought about by the crisis alone?

- No, they were not. The main source of problems is a huge bad debt. By our estimate, it is no less than 40 billion rubles. And a main reason for it was not the market situation but a low quality of the bank’s loan portfolio. In our case, the crisis was a sort of acid test that revealed the existing problems. Loans were extended without proper collateral, under incomprehensible schemes and not only to Russian but also to foreign companies. For this reason, VEB’s Supervisory Board made a decision to set up an interagency task force that incorporated representatives of law enforcement authorities to thoroughly study the situation with problem assets. We believe that we’ll be able to find a solution through legal actions and recovering debts by court.

- How many customers ran on the bank?

In September 2008, when VEB agreed upon a program of financial support for Svyaz-Bank with the Bank of Russia, periods of many deposits were expiring and corporate customers were withdrawing them. In October, the process continued but not as quickly as before. In total, the amount of funds in corporate customers’ accounts shrank from 104 to 58 billion rubles (during September – October). Companies related to the bank’s former shareholders as well as a number of organizations which were not related to the communications sector (construction, industry) accounted for the largest outflow of customers.

Communications companies with which the bank established open and reliable relations, namely, Federal State Unitary Enterprise (FSUE) the Post of Russia, and Svyazinvest are still being serviced by the bank, although the amount of their funds dwindled: the average balance calculated for the first quarter of 2009 with regard to FSUE the Post of Russia fell from 17 to 14.4 billion rubles from the same period in 2008, with regard to Svyazinvest - from17.8 to 16 billion rubles. Since November 2008, the bank has been pursuing an active policy aimed at preserving its customer base and at raising funds from new corporate customers, above all, by way of placing balances into settlement accounts and deposits and implementing its own bill of exchange program. State guarantees and reliability provided to the bank by VEB makes this process more effective. Customer confidence is returning. Moreover, this year the bank is trying to focus on diversifying its loan portfolio due to companies in other industrial sectors.

- Has the structure of corporate customers changed in the last months?

- It remains almost unchanged. Such communications companies as Megafon, Rostelecom, including Westelcom, MMT, Gidrosvyaz still account for the largest deposits. A major transaction in placing Zentrteleom’s funds is nearing completion. Besides the Post of Russia and Svyazinvest such companies as Angstrem. Trust Management Company Dostoyanie and Sinterra have substantial balances in their settlement accounts.

As to the structure of liabilities, short-term deposits (from one to six months) are dominant and customers roll them over if required. Since January the bank has started to work with new customers such as Mining and Steel Group Evraz and Development Company Invest-Group.

- And what happened to natural persons’ deposits?

- At the start of 2008, natural persons’  ruble deposits accounted for 95% of all deposits in the bank’s portfolio - 7.1 billion rubles and 70% of them were owned by VIP-customers. By the start of September the portfolio shrank to 5.2 billion rubles and the proportion of VIP-customers – to 26%. From September to December the amount of liabilities decreased by another 2.4 billion rubles because of deposits withdrawn by VIP customers, the proportion of which shrank to 5.8%. At this year’s start the situation changed for the better: people started to put their money in the bank. From January to May, the growth in deposits was 1.1 billion rubles and their amount increased to 3.8 billion rubles. The pattern of deposits also changed: the proportion of deposits in rubles dropped to 48.2% and in dollars in euros increased twofold and amounted to 21.2 and 28.2% respectively in the total portfolio. It should be noted that almost all deposits in the bank are retail ones and the proportion of VIP- customers declined to 1.6%.

- Did you have to reshuffle personnel?

- We replaced the management staff right away and nominated professional bankers to all key posts. Then we started to optimize the bank’s administration costs, trying to maximally retain personnel in the regions. It numbers about 3 thousand people and there are many real professionals among them.

- Did you have similar problems with Globex?

- No, the situation in Globex was somewhat different. For the most part, its credits are concentrated in one and the same sector, so it didn’t take us a lot of time to clean up its balances. Now the bank’s assets have been handed over to a specially established Vnesheconombank’s subsidiary – VEB-Invest Company.

- How much money has been spent on rescuing Svyaz-Bank?

- The total sum is 87 billion rubles. It includes Bank of Russia’s deposit and VEB’s own funds. For us Svyaz-Bank is an investment project. At the first stage our objective is to solve day-to-day problems, expand the bank’s branch network and offer quality services. And within three-five years we’ll be able to withdraw from the project by selling it to a strategic investor. By the way we are already receiving proposals. For example, recently a major foreign investment bank has turned to us expressing its readiness to enter Svyaz-Bank’s capital but with so far a small stake.

- In line with the Government’s crisis management program VEB started to perform newly-assumed functions of rescuing troubled banks. How does this correspond to typical functions as a development institution?

- There’s no doubt that both Svyaz-Bank and Globex were in a severely poor condition when they were transferred to VEB’s jurisdiction. But it was more a matter of supporting the banking sector rather than rescuing problem banks. We are trying to combine these two seemingly incompatible objectives - providing support and encouraging development. And while the problem is really formidable it is not unmanageable. In the long run we should not only help problem banks get back on their feet but boost the development of the whole economy.

I’d like to give just one example and maybe it’s not the most typical one. The Law on the Bank for Development and the Memorandum on its Financial Policies stipulate that the Bank is to finance major projects with long pay-back periods in certain economic sectors. But in real practice there emerge small projects, around above all, infrastructure projects. It would be wrong not to support them as they are important for the development of the country’s economy and regions. But we can solve this problem by using capabilities of VEB’s two subsidiary institutions - Svyaz-Bank and Globex. These banks have formed a good branch network in the regions. This would help us to channel money to those places where major Moscow’s banks have not come yet. Svyaz-Bank has already been drawn in implementing our regional projects. It is an operator responsible for VEB’s Olympic facilities construction projects. Now we are expanding its branch in Sochi so that it could fully service companies engaged in building Olympic facilities.

- This means that you have already identified Svyaz-Bank’s scope of work?

- Not exactly. We are still considering this issue. And it’s not only a matter of Svyaz-Bank. We are formulating a concept and identifying potential lines of activity for all members of Vnesheconombank Group which incorporates Svyaz-Bank, Globex, the Russian Development Bank and Roseximbank. We turned to a financial consultant – Ernst and Young Company. This Company has completed preparing several options of the concept for reorganizing VEB’s subsidiary banks. The Bank’s Management Board would consider these proposals and make an agreed decision and submit it to approval by the VEB’s Supervisory Board.

-Does this concept encompasses Belarusian Belvnesheconombank and Ukrainian Prominvestbank – Vnesheconombank participates in these banks’ capital?

- No, it does not. We didn’t set this objective.

- What options are under discussion, what do consultants recommend?

- Roseximbank is expected to give top priority to supporting exports. The more so, this function was assigned to VEB. At present, Globex is operating as a universal commercial bank.  We can’t rule out that it would continue to operate like this. There is a very interesting option for Svyaz-Bank. We believe that it might become a very influential sectoral bank operating in the communications sector, may be with functions of a “post bank”. Svyaz-Bank has been cooperating closely and for a long time with the Post of Russia and Svyazinvest, it also services accounts of other telecommunications companies. By joining forces, we’ll be able to create a pivotal bank which would enable us to make a breakthrough in restructuring, developing and financing one of the fastest growing, high-technology economic sectors. This idea was favored by the Telecommunications Ministry, Svyazinvest and the Post of Russia. We set up a joint commission which is to formulate a final decision.

- If such a pivotal bank is established, will it be responsible for servicing companies in a specific sector?

- Not only. Today more than 70% of Russians do not have bank accounts. And to a certain extent such a situation arose because many people do not have access to retail banking. I have already said that Svyaz-Bank is well represented in the regions – it has 49 branches and more than 160 branch offices. But now it’s too early to talk in great length about the bank’s and Vnesheconombank Group’s future core activity as a whole. It remains to be seen later whether the banks’ assets will be consolidated or whether each of them will go its own way. I’d like to stress that so far none of the options have been given high priority. According to our plans, a final scenario would be submitted to the Supervisory Board in July.

VEB purchased Svyaz-Bank and Globex at the last year’s end as part of measures for stabilizing the banking sector. The Central Bank provided financial aid by depositing 2.5 billion dollars with VEB to purchase Svyaz-Bank and 2 billion dollars to purchase Globex Bank.



Generating Profits is not Vnesheconombank’s Main Objective

8 june 2009 года

Weekly Business (Ukraine)
Author: Dmitry Grinkov

Vladimir Dmitriev, Chairman of State Corporation ‘Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank)’:

Generating Profits is not Vnesheconombank’s Main Objective”


Vnesheconombank, one of the largest Russian state banks, completed the transaction to purchase Ukraine’s Prominvestbank in early March 2009. We’d like to remind you that having faced a massive outflow of deposits in October 2008, the bank was on the verge of bankruptcy and was placed under the National Bank of Ukraine (the NBU) receivership. The bank’s principal former co-owner Vladimir Matvienko is sure that his brainchild was subjected to a pre-planned raider attack. The bank’s appeal was that the largest domestic enterprises’ assets were pledged as collateral against the bank’s credits. The names of ill-doers are still shrouded in secrecy. Although we know that several Russian banks were interested in purchasing a half-dead bank including Alfa-Bank. But in early November, the National Bank suddenly announced that Austria’s company Slav AG won the tender. Slav AG is controlled by people’s deputies from the Party of Regions Andrei and Sergei Klyuev. Nevertheless, for almost half a year, a new investor failed to find more than $ 1 billion required to rescue the bank. At a time when the National Bank already prepared a recommendation for the Finance Ministry, Slav AG announced that it would buy out the bank in consortium with Vnesheconombank, Russia’s state corporation (the agent for the Government) whose Supervisory Board is headed by Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin. Vnesheconombank Chairman Vladimir Dmitriev told about the transaction’s details, relations with politicians and oligarchs and real reasons for getting into Ukraine’s market in his exclusive interview to BUSINESS.


-Ukraine and Russia faced almost the same challenges of the global financial crisis. Nevertheless, the Russian banking system succeeded in avoiding a massive outflow of deposits and the devaluation of the ruble against the US dollar since last summer up until now has not exceeded 40% while the grivna lost 70% of its value at the peak of depreciation. How can you explain this difference?

Using our Finance Minister’s words we can say that we simply had a softer safety cushion in the form of the Reserve Fund, the National Wealth Fund and gold and foreign currency reserves of the Central Bank which accounted for 25% of the GDP as of the beginning of the crisis whereas in Ukraine this indicator was about 17%. On top of that, the political situation in your country was far from favorable for pursuing an adequate monetary and fiscal policy. Politicians’ recriminations and poorly coordinated actions do not help stabilize the economy. In this respect, the Russian authorities made appropriate decisions timely and faster than in good times. Specifically, it was decided in Russia to refinance domestic companies’ foreign debts, increase banks’ capital through extending state subordinated loans and use financial resources of the National Wealth Fund to support the stock market. Targeted assistance was provided to certain industries, credits were extended to system-forming enterprises and etc.

-In fact, Vnesheconombank is responsible for distributing funds intended to support Russian banks. For example, subordinated loans worth about $14 billion will be extended through your Bank and the largest corporations’ foreign debts will be refinanced through VEB for an amount of about $50 billon. Do you personally take decisions on supporting specific corporations or is this a responsibility of VEB’s Supervisory Board headed now by Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.

-Factually, Vnesheconombank accounts for 62% of the total amount of funds earmarked for financial stabilization. Despite that Vnesheconombank is not a classical corporate entity; all decisions are made within corporate regulations. Criteria for the state’s support were approved by the Bank’s Supervisory Board, banks submit their applications to us and we consider them subject to a clear-cut procedure. But individual decisions on specific banks are to be made by the Supervisory Board. One of criteria is a bank’s participation in lending to the economy. And here I mean not only production facilities but also population.

-What’s a principal difference between Vnesheconombank’s activity from that of other Russian state banks, for example, Sberbank, VTB?

-The most principal difference is that generating profits is not our Bank’s main objective. Hence, we work with those borrowers which are not comfortable for commercial banks or with those to which commercial banks can’t extend long-term, major credit resources. We finance projects worth at least 2 billion rubles (about $63 million). And the Bank’s participation share is not to be less than 1 billion rubles. We have also identified priority sectoral lending targets. For example, we are not entitled to provide lending to ordinary construction companies. But if we deal with infrastructure projects we finance such companies too. Lately, the Bank has started to perform functions unusual for it; it is implementing crisis management measures. The state’s financial aid goes through the Bank’s balance. So we have to build reserves against subordinated loans extended by the Bank and refinancing provided to the companies. None of commercial banks would have dared to do the job because they would have risked failing to meet the Central Bank’s financial regulations.

-How would you assess the demand for a new program of recapitalizing Russian banks through the use of federal bonds?

-I believe that this program would be appealing to banks, the more so, the Central Bank intends to increase this instrument’s share in banks’ capital to 50%. Of course some banks wouldn’t be very enthusiastic to see commissioners from the Central Bank in their governance bodies including their management.

-So, basically, we are talking here about nationalization – money is invested in capital in exchange for establishing control of a bank. There are more than 1000 banks in Russia now. How many banks in your opinion are likely to be nationalized?

 The state is not guided by its egoistical self-interest. The state’s goal is to secure the banking system’s sustainable operation. Implementing these measures, the state is trying to avoid a massive outflow of resources from banks. We should not forget about the state’s guarantees for deposits. If customers make runs on the banks the state will wish it had never happened. To my best knowledge, for the most part, support will be provided to system banks because the economy depends on their support and the lion’s share of people’s deposits is concentrated in them.

-Russian capital (including that of the state’s origin) has become one of the leaders on Ukraine’s banking market. It accounts for 25% of all foreign capital in our country’s banking sector. What’s the reason for such an active expansion?

-Despite this cumulative indicator, objectively speaking, Russia’s capital is far from being the leader on the Ukraine’s banking sector. The largest of banks with Russian capital ranks only 8th by the amount of assets and is not a state-owned bank (the case in point is Alfa-Bank). The reason for the expansion is evident. Ukraine is Russia’s important foreign trade partner, many companies work in the context of cooperation between our countries.


-Is that true that Vnesheconombank explored Ukraine’s banking market in order to purchase Prominvestbank (PIB) long ago? According to mass media reports you were holding negotiations on purchasing Brockbusinessbank. Were there any other banks under consideration?

-I don’t know who entertained this sort of ideas but I certainly didn’t for. We didn’t consider purchasing a bank in Ukraine at all. We were too busy reforming Vnesheconombank and establishing a bank for development on its basis. So we were too preoccupied with our own problems to think of expanding to the CIS countries. At the same time, we were considering the possibility of opening our representative office in Ukraine in order to start tapping the Ukrainian market but we did no more than that.

-But in spite of being busy with reforming your Bank you purchased Belvnesheconombank in 2007.

-The situation was somewhat different in Belarus. Historically, we had a less than 10% stake in Belvnesheconombank’s capital. This was our subsidiary as early as in the times of the Soviet Union. We increased our stake to synergize our relations.

-By the way, how did you dare to buy a problem Prominvestbank and the more so, invest $1 billion in the thick of the crisis. Is this a typical course of action for Vnesheconombank?

In this case, proletarian internationalism prevailed, our intention was to support not only the bank but also Ukraine as a whole. The fact is that the bank was a system financial institution. I can’t say that we monitored the market on a regular basis and took advantage of Prominvestbank’s difficulties at an appropriate time. By the way, Russian commercial banks set their sights on this bank.

-What banks besides Alfa-Bank do you mean?

-Specifically, banks with the state’s participation. But having assessed the scale of the disaster, they decided that it was better for them to strengthen their subsidiary banks in Ukraine rather than purchase something new with a huge number of skeletons in the closet. We focused on the bank’s role in lending to Ukraine’s industrial sector. The fact is that Prominvestbank services customers representing as much as half of Ukraine’s industrial potential. Most of these customers maintain close corporate ties with Russian enterprises. This is what we are telling our country’s leadership about. Moreover, up until now there hasn’t been a financial institution which was capable of dissolving a clot in mutual payments between some enterprises of our countries. Now we are in a position to do it. We believe that it is worthwhile moving to mutual payments in national currencies. Our interests are quite pragmatic - we want the ruble to become a regional reserve currency. We have gained a valuable business experience in cooperating with Belarus and why don’t we use it in Russian-Ukrainian relations.

-But Russian state banks have been operating on the Ukrainian market for a long time and you’ve mentioned some problems in mutual payments. Couldn’t these banks perform this function?

You should put this question to them rather than to us. Moreover, one of our priorities is to support Russian industrial exports. Undoubtedly, we are interested in restoring the potential that was built in the Soviet era when Russia supplied equipment to Ukrainian enterprises and vice versa.

-Who in particular offered you to purchase Prominvestbank?

-Our future partners did, namely, Slav AG Company. They explored the possibility of purchasing Prominvestbank thoroughly but they didn’t have enough resources to rescue the bank. They appear to have decided that in that situation a major Russian bank could be an ideal partner. And we have worked with them side by side since last October.


-Could you say when representatives of Slav AG turned to you? The fact is that an announcement about Vnesheconombank’s participation in the transaction to purchase Prominvestbank came only in the second decade of December.

-You are quite right. We were not in a position to make any official statements before all formalities were agreed upon. If my memory serves right, Slav AG representatives turned to us for the first time at the end of last October. We’ve got a list of visitors and I can tell you exactly when the Klyuev last name appeared in the visitor list.

-Which of the Klyuev brothers visited you?

Sergei did. At the time, Andrei was engaged in politics.

How did Vladimir Putin react to such a proposal?

Vladimir Putin’s reaction was quite adequate as he is following the situation in Ukraine very closely; he maintains contacts with Ukraine’s leadership and political leaders. While taking a decision on examining the issue of purchasing PIB thoroughly we, as I’ve already mentioned, considered such factors as integration and cooperation And the Bank’s Management Board was positive on the issue.

-We know that in order to purchase Belvnesheconombank you had to enlist Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko’s personal support. What Ukrainian politicians did you have talks with?

-I met with Alexander Grigoryevich but I didn’t try to enlist his support for increasing our stake in Belvnesheconombank. The fact is that a President should be in the know who is entering his country’s market. I also wanted to look into his eyes. But he didn’t specially sign any directives. There was a decision of the National Bank of Belarus. At the stage of discussing the transaction in Ukraine, I talked a lot with National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) Deputy Chairman Vladimir Krotyuk and I also had several meetings with NBU Chairman Vladimir Stelmakh. I also had a meeting with Prime Minister Yulia Timoshenko.

-What did you talk about?

-I was very frank, as I’m now with you, in expressing my opinion about the future of Prominvestbank. Yulia Timoshenko favored all our plans including an idea of transferring to mutual payments in national currencies. She favored the coming of a major system bank into the Ukrainian market and promised her full support.

-Did you discuss an issue of settling former Vnesheconombank of the USSR’s debts to Ukrainian companies? You must admit, this issue poses a substantial political risk to Vnesheconombank’s operation in Ukraine.

-No, we didn’t discuss this issue.

-Why did you decide to meet with the Prime Minister rather than with the President?

-My decision was based on the competence of the country’s leadership. The President is responsible for supreme goals and the Government is responsible for managing the economy.

-The sale of PIB to Vnesheconombank coincided in a remarkable manner with gas talks between Russia and Ukraine. Was this transaction a part of more global arrangements, a subject of concessions and compromises? Until the last moment they were considering the possibility of nationalizing PIB.

-In the course of our negotiations we have never been inclined to discuss the gas theme. With the exception that Naftogaz Ukraine is an attractive customer for us and we find it interesting to cooperate with it. There were no more linkages with the gas theme, at least, as far as my talks are concerned.


-According to PIB’s former owner Vladimir Matvienko, the bank was subjected to a meaningful raider attack. At your last press conference in Kiev you acknowledged this fact.

-Not exactly, I said what had happened to the bank; it looked like the beginning of a raider attack. Don’t tell me that one can send SMS messages to tens of thousands of customers warning them that the bank is on the verge of bankruptcy and telling them to withdraw their balances. Of course this couldn’t have happened by chance. Somebody just wanted to crush the bank. If stars are lit it means – there is someone who needs it.

-Half a year ago Mr. Matvienko could have sold his bank for $1.5-2 billion but he would not do it of his own free will. It is safe to assume that those who initiated this attack wanted to benefit from the situation, otherwise it would have made no sense for them to launch such a campaign. Did Vnesheconombank conduct an internal inquiry into the matter?

-Fortunately, I am not an investigator, we conducted no internal inquiries. We only generalized information from open sources including electronic mass media. Moreover, I can’t even suggest any theories on this matter. It is Ukrainian authorities that should inquire into the situation. They should try to explain why such situations emerge. Of course if you wish you can find wrongdoers but nothing is being done. It is not difficult to prove ill-will in this situation.

-It’s strange that you didn’t sort out this matter. Without it, you can’t prevent evil-doers from attacking the bank once more. The more so, it’s a lot easier to cause panic under the conditions of the crisis.

-Nevertheless, I rely on the prevailing common sense of our customers who do not succumb to panic in the current situation, given that Vnesheconombank is a majority shareholder. Panic breaks out when confidence vanishes. And confidence vanishes when shareholders behave inadequately. In my opinion our behavior is quite adequate.

-Do you think that Mr. Matvienko’s behavior was inadequate?

-I’m talking about the situation as a whole. As to the above-mentioned situation, unfortunately, it is quite complicated; if you pull thread you can see things you wouldn’t like to see. I would not like to elaborate on this matter further.


-Slav AG has a small stake (about 15%) which in actual practice does not give any rights. Do you have any arrangements with this major minority shareholder?  What influence does it have on managing the bank?

-We have worked in close contact with this shareholder since last October. It has a considerable political and economic potential. So, despite the fact that it does not have a blocking stake its opinion is taken into consideration in making decisions concerning the bank’s core activities. Moreover this shareholder is to participate in drawing customers (business) into the bank.

-What’s their practical interest?

-I think they see themselves as a portfolio investor which provides support to the bank to withdraw from investments with a premium later on.

-But a potential purchaser might not be interested in buying such a small stake. Moreover, Vnesheconombank can dilute Slav AG’s stake at any moment.

-So far, we don’t think we should do it. The fact is that Vnesheconombank could have bought out the whole additional issue on its own thus diluting stakes of all other shareholders

-Did Vnesheconombank purchase shares of PIB’s former shareholders or did it purchase only shares of the additional issue?

-No, we did not do business with Mr. Matvienko in his capacity of shareholder. We were buying out the additional issue and a part of shares owned by Slav AG. I don’t know anything about how Slav AG got them.

-Vnesheconombank’s Supervisory Board appointed Mr. Matvienko as PIB’s Honorary President. What’s his role in the bank?

-His role is statutory, it is a sign of respect for a man who established the bank and strengthened its positions in the country.

-The shareholders meeting decided to transform PIB into a public joint stock company and it also made Vyacheslav Boguslaev, Motor Sich Company Honorary President and one of the bank’s largest customers, a member of PIB’s Supervisory Board. Do you want to become a shareholder of the bank’s other largest companies?

-I didn’t hint that we would like to see our customers among the bank’s shareholders. We don’t have any plans to strengthen our customer base through selling stakes in the future to our borrower customers. Moreover, Motor Sich is not among our largest customers. Incorporating such respected persons as Evgeny Marchuk and Vyacheslav Boguslaev in PIB’s Supervisory Board is a recognition of their services and role in the politico-economic establishment. For example, Mr. Boguslaev is a respected person both in Ukraine and in Russia. He is an economic executive who is in favor of promoting bilateral relations and integration.

- They say that once PIB has been rescued it will be transferred to Russia’s Sberbank. Is this really the case?

- And why don’t we transfer it to VTB or, for example, to Alfa-Bank? Perhaps, there are people who entertain such ideas but nobody has discussed them with me. The thing is who is interested in them.



VLADIMIR DMITRIEV – Chairman of State Corporation ‘Bank for Development Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank)’

 BORN: August 25, 1953, in Moscow

EDUCATION: the Moscow Finance Institute (1975), specialty – “International Economic Relations”; Doctor of Economics

CARRIER: Corresponding member, Russian Academy of Natural Sciences

1975-1979 – engineer, State Committee of USSR Council of Ministers for Foreign Economic Relations; 1979-1986 – attachй, third secretary, USSR Foreign Ministry Department; 1986-1987 - research worker, Institute of World Economics and International Relations, USSR Academy of Sciences, 1987-1993 - USSR Embassy of USSR Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Russian Embassy of Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1993-1997 Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Russian Finance Ministry Department; 1997-2002 - First Deputy Chairman, Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of the USSR, 2002-2004 - Deputy President - Chairman of the Board, Bank for Foreign Trade of the USSR (OJSC), 2004-2007 - Chairman of Bank for Foreign Economic Affairs of the USSR, from June 2007 – Chairman of State Corporation “ Bank for Development and Foreign Economic Affairs (Vnesheconombank)”.


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